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Abstract 
This paper analyses Private Placements for the Australian biotechnology sector. 
Private placement is one of the favoured methods of secondary equity offering around 
the world. However, it is also the least studied corporate financing mechanism. A 
major issue around private placement is the impact of issuance to a selected group of 
institutional and/or high net worth sophisticated investors and the high direct costs of 
doing so. We first employ en event study methodology to separate out the large and 
small placement effects and short and long run effects. Given Australia’s weaker 
regulatory environment, we find significant negative cumulative abnormal return 
following private placements in the short term supporting the price pressure 
hypothesis with our main sample and with large private placement issues. Consistent 
with current empirical studies, mixed evidence regarding the directional impact was 
also observed as small issue exhibited positive price effects. We then hypothesize a 
model to measure and test the key factors identified in the literature. The model 
captures and explains strong medium term cumulative abnormal return effects and 
these effects are quite different between small and large placements.  
 
Keywords: private placement, event study, price effect, price pressure 
 
* Corresponding author. School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin 
University, Burwood 3125, Australia; Phone (613) 9251-7002; Fax (613) 9244-6283; 
Email: frank.lin@deakin.edu.au  
First Draft, please do not quote without consulting the authors. 
 1.0 Introduction 
The Australian Biotechnology industry is currently seen as a means to contribute 
significant national wealth for the future: the Australian Federal government has 
recently announced a spending program of AUD 500 million on medical and health 
research. Growth in the sector has been phenomenal in the last decade with the listed 
Australian Stock Exchange Healthcare and Biotech sector growth from 20 to 128
1 
companies with a market capitalisation of AUD 27.6Billion as of July 2006. More are 
expected to list in the near future as a large segment (approximately 60%) of the 
industry still remains in private hands. Crowe (2003) reported that there are over 300 
Australian companies focused on biotechnology and life science. 
Sparing and Vitale (2004) reported that between the years 1998 to 2002 on average, 
an Australian biotechnology IPO firm raised AUD 10.5 million whilst an American 
biotechnology IPO firm raised on average USD 85 million (approximately AUD 
113.3 million). Subsequent study by Yap and Lin (2006) reported an overall increase 
in the size of IPO issuance to AUD 22 million between the years 1999 to 2005. 
However, it still confirms the overall lack of scale and size of Australian 
biotechnology IPO by international standards. Given an estimated biotechnology 
product development and commercialization cost of between AUD 400-900 million 
(Gugliotti and Davidson, 2004), only a small fraction of the project cost were raise at 
IPO stage.  
Moreover, the majority of Australian biotechnology companies are in the early/middle 
developmental stage of product discovery and commercialization and are yet to make 
their first sale. Thus, with these companies’ limited revenue generation ability and 
little access to bank loan and/or debt markets, their only viable business model is to 
deplete shareholders’ equity followed by their frequent need to replenish equity losses 
by raising new equity. Therefore, successful future secondary capital raising is of vital 
importance to the survival and continued operations of Australian Biotechnology 
Companies. It also serves as a market signal in accordance with the concept of staged 
financing (Mayers, 1998). According to the concept, the optimal financing of a high 
risk firm such as biotechnologies with high clinical failures is to provide a limited 
                                                 
1 The data is obtained from Bioshares, a weekly publication providing market and company analysis of 
the Australian pharmaceutical and biotech industries. 
 amount of money at each stage of financing. As this money is about to run out and/or 
development obstacles have been cleared, investors and prospective financiers can 
then decide whether to provide more funds, and on what terms. 
Unlike public offerings and rights offerings, private placements’ post-issue resale 
regulatory environments are not consistent across the different international markets. 
For instance, in the U.S the resale of private placements can be restricted by Rule 144, 
which imposes a two year resale restriction. There may also be restrictions on the 
number of shares that may be resold
2 and to whom it may be sold
3. Currently in 
Australia there are no restrictions on the immediate resale of shares purchased through 
private placements or restriction on the size of discount to market price at which an 
issue can be placed. The weaker regulatory environment governing private equity 
placements of the Australian markets can lead to the potential abuse by issuers and 
purchasers of discounted private placements to immediately on-sell for a profit. This 
may imply that there will be a downward price pressure on the share price post-
issuance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the current 
hypothesis and reviews the empirical literature to date. In section 2 a number of 
hypothetical causality factors are identified for subsequent modelling. Section 3 
describes the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 outlines the methodologies. We 
first employ en event study methodology to separate out the large and small 
placement effects and short and long run effects. We then hypothesize a model to 
measure and test the key factors identified in section 2. Section 5 presents the 
empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.0 Literature  Review 
It is well known in corporate finance that firms time their equity issue to coincide 
with high equity prices (Baker, Stein, Wurgler (2003)). The rationale behind such 
market timing practices is supported by the underinvestment problem postulated by 
Myers and Maijluf (1984). Whereby firms will abstain from issuing equity and give 
                                                 
2 Number of shares sold in any three-month period must not exceed 1% of the number of shares 
outstanding or the average weekly volume of trading over the month before the sale. (Sheehan and 
Swisher (1998)) 
3 Unregistered placements may initially only be traded among other high net value investors (Wruck, 
(1998)) up potential investment opportunities whenever the firm believe the share of existing 
assets transferred to new stockholders exceeds the share of increased firm value 
retained by existing stockholders. Graham and Harvey (2001) find that two-thirds of 
CFOs agree that “the amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued was an 
important or very important consideration” in issuing capital. Ritter (1991) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) also argue that shareholders and management will attempt 
to take advantage of “window of opportunity” in choosing when to issue equity. 
Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1997) found that the private placement market as the fastest 
growing market in the financing of firms from 1980 to 1995 in the US. For instance, 
private equity placement accounted for $25 billion out of $85 billion of all stock 
issued on the U.S market in 1994 (The Federal Reserve Bulletin (1996)). However, 
the private equity placement is among the least-studied methods of corporate capital 
raising. Academic research papers in the US identify positive announcement reactions 
(Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993); however, the market reaction is less clear 
in other international markets. Positive reaction is also found in Japan (Kato and 
Schallheim (1993)) and Sweden (Molin, 1996), no significant abnormal return was 
found in Singapore (Tan, Chng and Tong (2002) and New Zealand
4 (Anderson, Rose 
and Cahan, 2004), negative abnormal return announcement return was found in 
Singapore (Chen, et al (2002)). While Hou and Meyer (2002) investigated Australian 
rights issues and reported significant abnormal returns, no study to date has been 
examined private placements in Australia. 
There is well-documented evidence of negative abnormal returns for short-term 
announcement effect following large price run-ups (Asquith and Mullins (1986), 
Masulis and Korwar (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Choe, Masulis, and Nanda 
(1993) and Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996)) and long-term (Loughran and Ritter 
1997). Consequentially, investors shall be able to infer that companies that issue 
equity publicly are statistically overvalued. The literature on private placements 
however has provided mixed evidence in regards to both short-term announcement 
effect and long term returns. 
                                                 
4 Result based on the entire sample of private placement. When the sample is split, significant positive 
abnormal announcement effect was found for private placements issued at a premium. Those placed at 
a discount exhibits a significant negative announcement effect. Existing studies on private equity offerings have identified several possible 
mechanisms that can have direct and indirect implications for the share market’s 
reaction to private placement. These theories impact are discussed below and 
summarized in table 1. 
Table 1 
 Academic Survey of Mechanisms effecting share price movement 
Mechanism/Hypothesis Private  Placement 
Price Pressure Hypothesis (Scholes, 1972)  -ve 
Agency cost effect   
(i) Converging Interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)  +ve 
(ii) Management entrenchment (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988) 
 
-ve 
(iii) Monitoring and control effects (Wruck, 1989)  +ve 
(iv) Insider opportunism  -ve 
(v) Wealth redistribution between shareholders and 
bondholders (Galai & Masulis, 1976) 
 
-ve 
Information effect   
(a)  Change in capital expenditure 
Value of current earning (Miller & Rock, 1985) 
 
-ve 
(b)  Change in capital structure 
Decreasing in financial leverage (Ross, 1977; Healy & 
Palepu, 1990, Masulis, 1983) 
 
-ve 
(c)  Change in ownership structure   
(i) Ownership fraction signal (Leland & Pyle, 1997)  +ve 
(ii) Informed investors signal (Hertzel & Smith, 1993)  +ve 
 
Basic financial theory such as CAPM assumes that there exists an infinitely elastic 
demand for equity
5. Scholes (1972) suggested that as there are no perfect substitutes 
for any stock and so each stock would be unique. Thus, the demand curve will be 
downward sloping rather than horizontal and as such, all else equal, we should 
therefore expect new issues to increase the equity supply. With no post-issuance 
resale restriction on the Australian market; a negative stock market reaction to all 
                                                 
5 For example, CAPM implies that the price is a function exclusively of risk and expected return types of equity offerings, whether public issues, rights issues, or private placement 
can be expected. Loderer and Zimmerman (1988) found that a 1% increase in the 
equity supply will lead to a 0.1% negative stock price reaction in the Swiss market. 
As the overall regulatory environment of New Zealand market is very similar to that 
of Australia, purchasers can be expected to take advantage of no post-issuance resale 
restrictions and immediately sell the new shares for an instant profit at the expense of 
less sophisticated investors. Based on the study of the New Zealand market by 
Anderson, Rose and Cahan (2006); where there exist nearly a ten-fold increase in 
volume traded for discounted private placements than private placements issued at a 
premium as well as a significant negative announcement effect. 
There also exist strong theoretical and empirical evidence that demonstrate the 
occurrence of significant insider trading around various corporate event 
announcements, including equity offerings (Kahle (2000)), earnings announcements 
(Park, Jang and Loeb (1995)), dividend announcements (John & Lang (1991)), capital 
expenditure announcements (John & Mishra (1990) and merger announcements 
(Keown & Pinkerton (1981)).  This coupled with the fact that in Australia there are no 
restrictions on the immediate resale restrictions for the private placements purchasers 
or limits on the size of discount to market price. Thus, potential abuses by issuers and 
purchasers to immediate on-sell at a profit will lead to an increase in the supply for 
the particular stock(s) and shift and alter the equilibrium price of the stock downwards 
over the short and medium term. 
The literature is mixed in regard to the effect of information signalling effect of 
private placements. Wruck (1989) suggests that private placements may restore the 
problems due to information asymmetry. The purchase of a large fraction of the firm’s 
shares by well-informed institutional and high net-worth private investors may send a 
credible signal of the firm’s quality. Hertzel and Smith (1993) extends the suggestion 
that together with management’s decision to forgo issue and the willingness of 
informed private investors to commit funds; will convey to the market the 
managements’ belief that the company is undervalued. Ross (1977) also contends that 
an equity issue will serve as a positive signal of the value of shares. However, the 
signalling benefit also raises the prospect of false signalling. Tan, Chng and Tong 
(2002) found no support that private placements signalling firm undervaluation. Akerlof’s (1970, 2002) lemon principal suggests that high information asymmetry in 
the private placement market is more likely to attract overvalued firms. Therefore, if 
private placement signals undervaluation, overvalued firms can benefit by placing 
shares with investors who can resell prior to the realization of the firm’s true value. In 
a related vein, Miller and Rock (1985) argues that private placement can be seen as a 
negative signal, for external financing are indicative of financial shortfalls in 
operating cash flow. As such it is signal of management’s reduced cash flow 
expectations. Kang et al (1999) conflicts the lemon principal by arguing that firms are 
unlikely to be able to exploit the market in private placement because the investors 
that participate in these placements are well informed. 
It is contended that the purchasers of private placements are sophisticated well-
informed institutional and/or high net worth investors that have greater knowledge of 
the firm’s future value prospects. Accordingly, Kirshnamurthy (2005) suggests that 
perhaps investors in the private placement market are buying the equity at the fair 
market value. In the same vein, Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) suggest that share issue 
prices signals firm quality and the deeper the discount the more negative the signal. 
Thus, when purchasers pay a premium, it signals that they believe that the stock is 
currently undervalued. A discount, on the other hand, indicates that the firm is 
currently overvalued and the deeper the discount the greater the overvaluation. 
The agency theory implies that firm’s agents (i.e. managements) can possess ulterior 
motives and pursue interests that differ from the best interests of the firm. 
Accordingly, the greater the divergence of interests between the agents and the firm 
the greater the agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) convergence-of-interests 
hypothesis suggests that increases in percentage ownership held by management can 
serve to align the interests of agents and the firm. Thus, private placements that 
increase the ownership fraction can expect positive market reactions, while private 
placements that reduces managerial holding will lead to a negative reaction. 
Moreover, since investors in the private placements market are more sophisticated 
group and often buy a large fraction of the firm’s shares, shareholders can all benefit 
from the potential monitoring and controlling of the firm’s managers behaviours by 
these block investors (Wruck, 1989).
3.   Data 3.1.   Sample Selection 
The preliminary step in the sample selection process was to identify all listed 
biotechnology and medical care, equipment and service equipment firms that engaged 
in secondary equity offerings between January 2004 and December 2004. Searches 
were conducted on the Aspect Huntley website containing historical individual 
company announcements to the ASX for all companies that have Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) industry class as being pharmaceutical, biotechnology 
& life science and health care, equipment & services. The classifications of 
Biotechnology Company were extended to include companies listed in the health care, 
equipment & services sector. The rationale to incorporate the health care, equipment 
& services as biotechnology is because many of the companies listed within this 
sector are also engaging in the product development
6 with a biotechnology or life 
science focus. For the period under the study, 52 initial secondary equity raising 
events by 40 companies were observed. 
 
Table 2 
Sample Selection of Secondary Equity Offerings (SO) in 2004 
This table presents the process and amount by which observations were selected for inclusion in the final sample for analysis. 
The ASX company announcement website and the GICS industry classification was used to formulate an initial list of events for 
the year 2004. Observations were then progressively removed according to the reasons stated in the table. The final sample 
yielded the candidate observation for which private placements was used. These observation were then cleansing to contain only 
the amount raised through private placement and subject of eventual analysis. 
  No of Observations  Amount Raised 
Initial Total  52  $326.51 M (61.83%*) 
PO, RI & EO**   -6  -$43.6 M  
SPP***  -5  -$31 M  
Final Sample****  41  $251.91 M  
PP proportion  -  $229 M 
RI, EO, SPP with PP  -  $22.91 M 
*This denotes the percentage of Secondary Equity Offering to the share of Total biotechnology Corporate 
Financing in 2004, inclusive of IPOs 
**PO – Public Offerings, RI – Rights Issues, EO – Entitlement Offers. 
***SPP – Shareholders Purchase Plan 
****29 of the observations raised equity only thorough PP, 12 of the observation raised with PP combined with 
RI, EO and SPP 
 
Next the sample was screened to remove observations that may have introduced a 
potential bias to the result. All secondary equity offerings that did not involve private 
placements to institutional and/or high net worth sophisticated investors were 
                                                 
6 The product development includes development of endoscopy lens, safety syringes, ophthalmology 
devices, artificial heart devices etc. removed. Table 2 provides a numerical overview of the sample selection process, with 
the final sample containing 41 observations. Finally, as 12 of private placements were 
done conjointly with other form of secondary offerings, it was cleansed to only 
contain the amount raised by private placement. 
 
3.2.   Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 
Summary Statistics for Private Placements in 2004 
PP’s Share of Biotechnology’s Financing in 2004  43.37 % 
PP’s Share of Biotechnology’s SO in 2004  70.14 % 
Average Private Placement Size  $5.6 M 
Mode & Median Private Placement Size   $3 M 
Mean Issue Percentage  18.37% 
No of Issue that exceeds the 12 month limit*  16** 




Average Number of Trading days with Zero Return 
during the Estimation Period 
27.12 days 
 
Average Number of Trading days with Zero Return 
during the Event window 
17.71 days 
 
Average Number of Trading days with Zero Return 
due to No-Trading 
12.95 days 
 
*The ASX listing rule states that in any given 12 month period, PP over 15% of issue capital must obtain 
shareholders approval.  
**This denotes the number of company that exceed the ASX listing rule for PP in just placement 
 
Consistent with Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1997), it was found that private placement 
accounted for 43.15% of all biotechnology firms’ corporate financing activities in 
2004 and represented 70.14% of all secondary equity offering. The average size of the 
private placement sample was $5.6 million, however, with large dispersion and fat 
tails at either side of the distribution
7, mode and median of $3 million would be a 
much more meaningful measure. Of particular note is that, although no attempt was 
made to identify the number of company that exceeding the ASX listing rule 
regarding the 12 month private placement limit of 15% of issue capital, it was 
identified that the average size of private placement was 18.37% of issued capital and 
16 of the companies exceeded the limit in just one single issue. The largest issued of 
private placement issued 1.1297 times the total amount of Fully Paid Ordinary Shares 
                                                 
7 6 companies raised $10 M or more (total $114.7 M), 12 companies raised less than $2.1 M (total 
$14.75 M) (FPO). This signifies that shareholders’ approval to exceed the 12 month limit is 
easily obtainable. 
The non-synchronous and thin trading that exists on the biotechnology sector must 
also be highlighted. Of the total 166 days
8 used in the study, a total average of 46.78 
days had zero return. 27.12 of those days also occurred during the estimation period 
which can contaminate the estimation period statistics used throughout the study. The 
17.71 zero return days that occurred during the even window would also create a 
directional bias in the result. This effect may downward bias the estimated standard 
error in the estimation error. 
4.0 Methodology 
4.1 Event Study Methodology 
An event study framework was utilized to investigate the private placement effect. 
Consistent with prior literature, the announcement date of the private placement (as 
opposed to the actual placement date) is taken as the event day for each sample 
observation, allowing the entire sample to be aligned in event time. Unfortunately, 
individual companies make their private placement announcement at their discretion, 
thus to give market participants sufficient time to review the contents of the 
announcement, adjustments are made to the determination of the event day. Applying 
the efficient market hypothesis, for companies that release their announcement prior 
to the market opening or during the intra-day trading time, the announcement date 
was used as the actual event day. For companies where the announcement are made 
after the market has closed, the trading day after was used as the event day.
9 All 
information is taken from the company announcement as they are lodged to the ASX. 
Prices and market variables are downloaded from the Bloomberg database. The 
specific methodologies applied to price data are described below. 
To analyse the price effect of the private placement, the standard market model 
approach was employed as outline in Dodd & Warner (1983) and Brown & Warner 
(1985). Specifically, each sample observation was regressed against a market index 
using an ordinary least square (OLS) regression as follows: 
                                                 
8 166 days is made up of 100 days used to calculate the estimation period statistics, 5 pre-
announcements days, 1 event day and 60 post announcement days. 
9 Most US studies use the trading day after the evening announcement, AD+1, as the event day. it mt i i it ε R β α R + + =     (1) 
where:   is the continuous return on the shares of firm i during period t;  it R
   is the continuous return on the market index mt R
10 during period t; 
   is the intercept for firm i; and  i α
   is the slope coefficient (market beta) for firm i.  i β
An estimation window of (-115, -16) was used for the above regression. The window 
was deemed appropriate considering that prior studies tended to use a similar size 
estimation window, and that 100 trading days strike a balance between accurately 
gauging a company’s relationship to the market and incorporating too many firm 
specific trends that could bias the regression.  
The alpha and beta of the market model were used to calculate the predicted returns of 
each observation over a range of event window, [(-15,+15) (-15.+30), (-15,+60), (-
10,+15) (-10.+30), (-10,+60), (-5,+15) (-5.+30), (-5,+60)]. The Abnormal return (AR) 
for each event day was then calculated as the difference between the observed return 
and predicted return. 
Next, the observations were segregated into different sub-sample groups. 
Standardized abnormal return (SAR) was aggregated across N firm for each sub-














where:   is the standardized abnormal return for firm j in day t of the event 
window 
jt SAR
   is the abnormal return for firm j in day t of the event window and   jt AR
2
jt AR S  is the variance for firm j in day t of the event window 
                                                 
10 Two indices were employed: the ASX 200 and the GICS Pharmaceutical index. Given the direction 
and magnitude was similar, the appropriate market index for each regression was determined to be the 
ASX 200, it is the universal market index, for comparative purposes. tj TSAR  is the total standardized abnormal return for the sample on day t of the 
event window 
j = 1 & N are the first and last firm, respectively in the sample sub group 
Additional, to analyse the price effect over the event period, the total cumulative 









t N TSAR TSCAR  (3) 
where:   is the total standardized cumulative abnormal return over period N;  N TSCAR
   are the first and last event days, respectively, of period N  2 1 t & t



































































TSCAR Z  (4) 
where:   is the total standardized cumulative abnormal return over period N;  N TSCAR
   = number of observed trading day returns for firm j over the estimation 
period 
j D
   = earliest date in the event window  1 T
2 T  = later date in the even window 
N = number of firm in the sample 
4.2 Ordinary Least Square Methodology 
The models developed here aim to identify the explanatory factors of private 
placement announcement returns and are tested using an ordinary least square regression framework. The following multivariate regression equation was used as the 
restricted model
11: 
it 5 4 3 2 1 i it t ε α CAR or    AR + + + + + + = DIS SIZE IPER IPRI DUM β β β β β  (5) 
Where ARt is equal to the raw abnormal return on day t and CAR is equal to the raw 
cumulative abnormal return as measured from day -5 to day t. DUM is the dummy 
variable for a large private placement issue that is above $3 million. IPRI is the log of 
the issue price. IPER is the log of the issue percentage of the private placements. 
SIZE is the log of the market capitalization before the announcement date. DIS is the 
log of the discount which is measured by the issue price divided by the closing price 
on the day before the announcements. The significant difference between the groups 
classed as large and small private issue identified earlier was used as the foundation 
from which the unrestricted model: 
it 9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 i it t
ε _ _ _ _
α CAR or    AR
+ + + + +
+ + + + + =
B DIS B SIZE B IPER B IPRI
DIS SIZE IPER IPRI DUM
β β β β
β β β β β
   (6) 
Where IPRI_B is the log of the issue price multiply by the dummy variable. IPER_B 
is the log of the issue percentage of the private placements multiply by the dummy 
variable. SIZE_B is the log of the market capitalization before the announcement date 
multiply by the dummy variable. DIS_B is the log of the discount which is measured 
by the issue price divided by the closing price on the day before the announcements, 
multiply by the dummy variable.  
5.0 Results 
The statistical analyses and main results of this study are presented below. As 
highlighted earlier, calculations were performed using the ASX 200 as the universal 
market index and the Pharmaceutical Index
12 to examine the effect of the benchmark 
                                                 
11 Initial OLS had one additional independent variable, Issue Difference, being the log of the actual 
number of new shares issued over the announced number of new shares to be issued. This variable was 
removed as 34 of the observation had zero deviation between the actual versus announced. 
12 Bloomberg code AS51PHRM effect. The results that follow were similar and were not materially affected by this 
variation. Given the ASX 200 is the primary share market index it was chosen as the 
market index proxy. Alternative calculations were also undertaken using a range of 
different event windows to test for the sensitivity and robustness of the event. The 
direction of the results was similar and hence the most consistent event window of -5 
to +60 was chosen (alternative results are not reported but available from the authors 
on request)  
5.1  Event Study Results 
Appendix 1 summarises the price effect of private placement announcements over 
daily intervals. Figure 1 show the TSCAR for the entire sample during the event 
window. The TSAR at event day +1 experienced significant negative daily returns of 
-17.26%, with z statistics of -2.67 and achieving statically significant p value at the 
1% level. Although, the result would be considerably more powerful had the event 
day TSAR also achieve statistical significance, it nevertheless recorded a TSAR of -
7.51% on the event day. Day 7, 25, 34 and 44 were also significant at either the 1% or 
the 5% interval. The remaining days post the event day was statistically insignificant 
at the 5% threshold. 
Figure 1 















  The TSCAR achieved statistical significance from day +8 onwards, the exception of 
day 12, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 54 and 56. However, as far as the price effect is concerned, 
these exceptions were rather insignificant given the TSCAR quickly achieve statistical 
significance the follow day(s). It is interesting that, although these results appear to be 
supportive of an obvious price effect, the price adjustment process is a gradual drift 
downwards in 25 days rather than a quick shift towards a new equilibrium price as 
observed in Figure 1. This gradual rundown in the returns subsequent to private 
placement announcements is in sharp contrast to all other private placement studies 
except for Kato and Schallheim (1993) and Anderson, Rose and Cahan (2006). 
Figure 2 



















Appendix 2 summarises the price effect of large private placement announcements 
over daily intervals for the sub sample classed as a large issue above the modal value 
of AUD 3 million, containing 23 observations. Figure 2 show the TSCAR for the 
entire sample during the event window. The TSAR at the event day +1 experienced 
significant negative daily returns of -17.47%, with z statistics of -3.61 and achieving 
statically significant p value at the 1% level. TSCAR achieve significance from event 
day +1 onwards till the end of the event window at the 1% level. Significantly, the result of this sample was considerably more powerful than the entire sample as can be 
observed from Figure 2, where there existed an almost straight downward slope and a 
TCSAR that was in excess of that of the sample. The result from this subgroup 
indicates the price pressure hypothesis does exist to robustly support the price effect 
following private placement. 
Appendix 3 summarises the price effect of small private placement announcements 
over daily intervals for the sub sample classed as a small issue, modal value of AUD 3 
million or less, containing 18 observations. Figure 3 show the TSCAR for the entire 
sample during the event window. The TSAR only achieve significance on day 16, 34, 
42 and 46 at the 5% level, and, interestingly, all other including days with close 
proximity to the event day remained statistically insignificant. Moreover, throughout 
the event period TSCAR for small issues remained statistically insignificant.  
Figure 3 



















From Figure 3, it can be observed that following the event day, there was a sharp 
upward price movement followed by a price correction and volatile fluctuation before 
trending upwards at the end of the event window. It indicates that there are other 
forces affecting the price effect following private placement. More specifically, given 
the relative small size of the capital raising it can be inferred that it would only be sufficient for the short term given the expenditure needs of the product development. 
The injection of much needed capital would in fact be a favourable market 
information signal. As is the private placement of significant size of holding to 
institutional and/or high net worth, sophisticated investors and their ability to control 
and monitor management. 
Other sub samples such the issuing characteristics of private placement only, or 
combined with other form of secondary offering, size of issue and percentage of issue 
were also used in the study. However, the contamination of mixing large and small 
size private placement issue reduced the power of the test given their opposite price 
effect and as such these results were not used for the purpose of this study. 
5.2  OLS Regression Results 
In line with earlier findings, the opposite effect on the share price post issuance 
between the large and small private placement groups resulted in the cross-
contamination in the restricted model. As such the restricted model was a model with 
significantly less predicative power as compared to the unrestricted model, which can 
be observed from the adjusted R squared value. The unrestricted model was better 
suited in capturing and identifying the differing impact the independent variables had 
on the AR and CAR of the large and small private placement groups. It could be 
illustrated by the F-test, where there were substantial difference between the large and 
the small private placements and especially in the short term with CAR+5, CAR+10 
and CAR+20 achieving significance at the 5% level. Thus, the results of the 
unrestricted model need to be discussed in detail. 
 
The intercept and the dummy variable in Table 1 and Table 2 show that following the 
announcement, the small and large group exhibits distinctly different paths. CAR 
results for the small private placement group displayed the same characteristics as the 
event study methodology, where, initially, the share price reaction were positive 
CAR+1 to CAR+10, followed by some fluctuation from CAR+10 to CAR+30 before 
finishing strong upwards at CAR+60. CAR results for the large private placement 
group also affirm earlier event study finding as CAR trended consistently downward 
from CAR+1 onwards and were statistically significant at the 5% level from CAR+5 
onwards.  Table 1 Regression Estimation Result 
This table reports the results of estimating the restricted and unrestricted form models of the independent variables. The table 
reports OLS parameter estimates and p-value in parentheses. The table also reports a range of regression diagnostics including 
the adjusted R squared and the F test for the exclusion restrictions in the reduced model. DUM is the dummy variable for those 
companies that issued private placements above $3 million. IPRI is the log of the issue price. IPER is the log of the issue 
percentage of the private placements. SIZE is the log of the market capitalization before the announcement date. DIS is the log of 
the discount which is measured by the issue price divided by the closing price on the day before the announcements. IPRI_B is 
the log of the issue price multiply by the dummy variable. IPER_B is the log of the issue percentage of the private placements 
multiply by the dummy variable. SIZE_B is the log of the market capitalization before the announcement date multiply by the 
dummy variable. DIS_B is the log of the discount which is measured by the issue price divided by the closing price on the day 
before the announcements multiply by the dummy variable. AR+1 is the raw abnormal return on the day after the announcement. 
CAR is the raw cumulative abnormal return as calculated from Day-5 to the ending day as indicated. 
Variable AR1 CAR +1  CAR +5  CAR +10 
    R U  R U  R U  R U 
Intercept -0.0604  -0.7289  -0.0467 1.1234  -0.3060 1.5125  -0.3459 1.5858 
   (0.8681)  (0.1349)  (0.9437) (0.2181) (0.6916) (0.1137)  (0.6818) (0.1246) 
DUM  -0.0146 1.1013  -0.0766 -2.3005  -0.0716 -3.5967  -0.0868 -4.4848 
   (0.6317)  (.1901)  (0.1735) (0.1474)  (0.2727) (0.0328)** (0.2246) (0.0145)** 
IPRI -0.0219  -0.0056  -0.0032  0.0219 -0.0293  0.0322  -0.0651  0.1240 
   (0.2760)  (0.8201)  (0.9288) (0.6378) (0.4889) (0.5065)  (0.1643) (0.8120) 
IPER  0.0645 0.5078  0.1203 -0.2782  -0.0041 -0.7378  -0.0704 -0.6836 
   (0.5229)  (0.0146)** (0.5119) (0.4572) (0.9846) (0.0641)  (0.7629) (0.1010) 
SIZE  0.0020 0.0395  0.0022 -0.0631  0.0165 -0.0819  0.0171 -0.0881 
   (0.9211)  (0.1511)  (0.9522) (0.2212) (0.7031) (0.1292)  (0.7181) (0.1311) 
DIS 0.0588  0.0485  -0.0181  -0.0918  -0.1130 -0.1359  0.0319  -0.1222 
   (0.1322)  (0.2384)  (0.7959) (0.2360) (0.8897) (0.0953)  (0.7209) (0.1625) 
IPRI_B  0 0.0059  0 -0.0478  0 -0.1158  0 -0.1725 
      (0.8991)    (0.5870)    (0.2109)     (0.0882) 
IPER_B  0 -0.4999  0 0.0664  0 1.1689  0 1.0446 
      (0.0340)**   (0.1283)    (0.0126)**     (0.0363)** 
SIZE_B  0 -0.0594  0 0.1253  0 0.1941  0 0.2430 
      (0.1968)    (0.1500)    (0.0354)**     (0.0161)** 
DIS_B 0 0.2416  0 0.6177  0 0.9055  0 1.0458 
      (0.0971)     (0.0270)**    (0.0026)***     (0.0015)***
Adjusted R
2 0.1973 0.2172  0.0029 0.0872  0.0110 0.2793  0.1293 0.3799 
F stats     2.0026    1.4459     3.4063**     3.6288** 
Observations  41 41  41 41  41 41  41 41 
**   denotes significance at the 5% level 
***  denotes significance at the 1% level 
 
Consistent with their diverging paths of return, it can be clearly observed that the 
impact of the selected impendent variables often had opposite effect on the CAR for 
the large and small groups. Issue price was the only variable that displayed similar 
price effect as the event study and the dummy variable findings. It exerted a small 
positive influence (ranging from 0.0161 to 0.1240) for the small group’s CAR+1 up to 
CAR+20 before reverting negative (-0.0340, -0.1559), whilst issue price had a 
consistently negative and widening impact on the large group’s CAR (ranging from -
0.0259 to -.4908)
13. The findings above are consistent with Ritter (1991) and 
 
                                                 
13 Issue price for large group is calculated by summation of I_PRI and I_PRIC_B. Table 2 Regression Estimation Result (Cont.) 
Variable CAR  +20  CAR +30  CAR +60 
    R  U R U R  U 
Intercept  -0.8470  0.7571 -1.1819  0.6916 0.7601  4.6907 
   (0.3836)  (0.5348)  (0.2138) (0.5779) (0.6612) (0.0511) 
DUM  -0.0722  -5.0093 -0.0981 -5.3593 -0.0740  -10.8712 
   (0.3766)  (0.0228)** (0.2190) (0.0173)** (0.6113) (0.0108)** 
IPRI -0.0961  0.0161  -0.1121  -0.0340 -0.1800  -0.1559 
   (0.0762)  (0.7983)  (0.0352)** (0.5334) (0.0643) (0.2011) 
IPER  0.0597  -0.2599 0.0714  -0.3608 -0.3692  -1.3168 
   (0.8236)  (0.6060)  (0.7937) (0.4833) (0.4430) (0.1783) 
SIZE 0.0396  -0.0456  0.0585  -0.0452 -0.0536  -0.2812 
   (0.4677)  (0.5082)  (0.2715) (0.5201) (0.5824) (0.0393)** 
DIS  -0.0435  -0.2241 -0.0229 -0.1735 0.0174  -0.1665 
   (0.6707)  (0.0365)** (0.8175) (0.1070) (0.9241) (0.4034) 
IPRI_B  0  -0.2801 0  -0.2300 0  -0.3349 
      (0.0236)**    (0.0644)     (0.1476) 
IPER_B  0  0.6491 0  0.7326 0  1.2913 
      (0.2661)     (0.2193)     (0.2488) 
SIZE_B  0  0.2694 0  0.2902 0  0.6014 
      (0.0252)**    (0.0185)**    (0.0101)** 
DIS_B  0  0.9839 0  0.7826 0  0.5786 
      (0.0101)**    (0.0405)**    (0.4070) 
Adjusted R
2 0.2330  0.4017 0.2940 0.3949 0.3088  0.3829 
F stats     2.7737**    1.9660     1.6412 
Observations  41  41 41 41 41  41 
 **   denotes significance at the 5% level 
***  denotes significance at the 1% level 
 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) “window of opportunity” argument whereby the 
management issues shares near price peaks and confirmed by this study where it was 
the only time that both groups displayed the same directional impact. 
In contrast to the earlier results, the impact of all other variables, namely: issue 
percentage, size and discount on CAR, were all positive for the large private 
placement group and negative for the small private placement group. For the small 
group, given smaller proceed from issuance and the annual cash burn of 
biotechnology companies, it will not last beyond the short term. Thus, the share price 
effect will be negatively correlated with the size of companies where cash burns can 
be expected to be higher for larger companies. Consistent with the insider 
opportunism hypothesis, the larger issue percentage and the greater the size of the 
discount, the more likely that it will lead to abuses by purchasers to immediately on-
sell for a profit and cause a negative price effect. This is especially so, given 
Australia’s lack of restriction on share trading post private placement issuance. For the large group, the opposite effect will dominate and this is consistent with the 
informed investor signal hypothesis as proposed by Hertzel and Smith (1993): the 
willingness of the informed investors to commit substantial funds will send a positive 
and credible market signal. The high issue percentage and the large size of the 
company both mean that informed investors will have to commit more funds to 
purchase a higher percentage and/or a large company. Given the large size of 
issuance, larger discount also had a positive price effect. For the willingness of 
informed investors to invest and the management to compensate these informed 
investors’ will act to alleviate the concerns of owning an Akerlof’s (1970, 2002) 
“lemon”.  As such the management decision to forgo other form of capital raising will 
convey to the market the managements’ belief that the company is undervalued. 
It is interesting also to note that whilst significance at the 5% level was achieve for the 




16, their opposite effect are not the explanatory 
factors of negative and significant post private placement announcement price effect 
returns for the large group.  
 
6.0 Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the private placement effect on share price for companies 
as defined as Biotechnologies over the 66 days period surrounding the announcement 
to the market. 
The results have indicated clear stock price effect around the announcement period. It 
was found that share prices the 1
st day after the announcement was associated with 
significant negative abnormal returns for private placement of $3million or more. 
Furthermore, the continued persistent significant negative total cumulative 
standardized abnormal returns (TSCAR) even after 60 days following the 
announcement provides strong support for the price pressure hypothesis. Where the 
price effects are consistent with the notion that the demand curve will be downward 
                                                 
14 Issue percentage for the large group was deemed significant at AR1, CAR +5 and CAR +10 
15 Size for the large group was deemed significant at CAR +5, CAR +10, CAR +20, CAR +30, CAR 
+60 
16 Discount for the large group was deemed significant at CAR +1, CAR +5, CAR +10, CAR +20, 
CAR +30,  sloping rather than horizontal and as such, private placements that increase the equity 
supply will have a negative impact.  
Overall, the negative results are consistent with the notion that managers have taken 
full advantage of the “window of opportunity” in choosing when to issue their equity 
as well-informed institutional and high net-worth private investors will only be 
willing to commit funds at fair value. This can be viewed as a double edge sword. On 
the one hand, the price adjustment post private placement of mean reverting towards 
the new fair equilibrium price of the company can be interpreted as having a negative 
impact to the short term wealth of existing shareholders. However, on the other hand, 
new capital injections are of vital importance to the survival of the biotechnology 
companies. Thus, each successful private placement can also be interpreted as a 
validation signal by well-informed investors and management seizing the right 
opportunity in shoring up the depleting equity ensuring the continued operations for 
the product development and commercialization. Interpreting the positive TSCAR at 
day +60 by the subgroup deemed to be small private placements after an initial period 
of fluctuation. It is plausible to infer the existence of informed investors’ signal given 
informed investors are less likely to invest in “lemons” and will also be able to exert 
better control and monitoring of the management and reduce the agency cost. 
The regression results affirms the event study findings, where it can be observed that 
intercept for subgroup of small private placements and the dummy variable being the 
subgroup of large private placement issue size above $3M, are the definitive variables 
that will both separate and best explain the resultant share price reaction post private 
placement announcement. The other independent variables: issue price, issue 
percentage, size and discount also reaffirm the existence of informed investors’ 
signal, improvement in the monitoring and control effect especially for the large 
private placements subgroup. 
The number of listed biotechnology companies will continue to grow on the 
Australian Stock Exchange. It is also conceivable that the amount and the number of 
private placements will expand several fold in the coming years. Further refinement 
of sub sample characteristics would also add more power to the test and the 
identification of more independent variables.  Hence, continued investigation of this 
research is warranted in the future. One problem is the frequency and non-synchronous nature of thin trading as observed by the number of trading days with 
zero return. This is more pronounced in these small firms whose placement value is 
below the modal value. An emphasis on developing a revised event study 
methodology that will resolve the truncation bias in the middle will help to shed 
further light on the exact nature of the private placement effect on the Australian 
biotechnology sector. Additional, volume can also be used as an independent variable 
to capture the potential abuse of insider opportunism by purchasers of private 
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 Appendix 1 
Total Stock Price Effects Surrounding the Announcement of Private Placement 
This table presents the stock price effects surrounding private placement announcements by biotechnology companies over the 
sample period of January 2004 to December 2004. The event day (Day 0) is defined as the actual date of announcement by the 
company. TAR is the total abnormal return of the cross-sectionally combined observations for the relevant event day. TSCAR is 
the total cumulative average abnormal return between day -5 and the relevant event day   
Panel A: Daily Average Abnormal Returns      
Event Day  TSAR  Z Statistic  p Value  TSCAR  Z Statistic  p Value 
-5  0.9189 0.1420 0.8871 0.9189  0.1420  0.8871 
-4  0.1585 0.0245 0.9804 1.0774  0.1178  0.9063 
-3 -8.7504  -1.3526  0.1762  -7.6730  -0.6848  0.4935 
-2 -3.1874  -0.4927  0.6222  -10.8603  -0.8394  0.4013 
-1 2.4606  0.3803  0.7037 -8.3998  -0.5806  0.5615 
0 -7.5073  -1.1604  0.2459  -15.9071  -1.0038  0.3155 
1 -17.2560  -2.6673  0.0076** -33.1631 -1.9375  0.0527 
2 -0.2165  -0.0335  0.9733  -33.3796  -1.8242  0.0681 
3 -1.1823  -0.1827  0.8550  -34.5619  -1.7808  0.0750 
4 7.4950  1.1585  0.2467  -27.0668  -1.3230  0.1858 
5 -3.6126  -0.5584  0.5766  -30.6794  -1.4298  0.1528 
6 4.7684  0.7371  0.4611  -25.9110  -1.1562  0.2476 
7 -16.6591  -2.5750  0.0100** -42.5701 -1.8250  0.0680 
8 -7.0423  -1.0885  0.2764  -49.6125  -2.0495  0.0404*
9 -3.9299  -0.6075  0.5436  -53.5423  -2.1369  0.0326*
10 -1.8423  -0.2848  0.7758  -55.3847  -2.1402  0.0323*
11 -4.5492  -0.7032  0.4819  -59.9338  -2.2469  0.0246*
12 6.7831  1.0485  0.2944  -53.1507  -1.9364  0.0528 
13 -7.5378  -1.1651  0.2440  -60.6885  -2.1521  0.0314*
14 2.6941  0.4164  0.6771  -57.9944  -2.0045  0.0450*
15 -4.6624  -0.7207  0.4711  -62.6568  -2.1134  0.0346*
16 -8.1801  -1.2644  0.2061  -70.8369  -2.3344  0.0196*
17 -2.1038  -0.3252  0.7450  -72.9407  -2.3509  0.0187*
18 -3.0473  -0.4710  0.6376  -75.9880  -2.3976  0.0165*
19 -1.8016  -0.2785  0.7806  -77.7896  -2.4048  0.0162*
20 -4.2615  -0.6587  0.5101  -82.0511  -2.4873  0.0129*
21 1.3237  0.2046  0.8379  -80.7274  -2.4014  0.0163*
22 -3.1454  -0.4862  0.6268  -83.8728  -2.4500  0.0143*
23 -1.4935  -0.2309  0.8174  -85.3663  -2.4503  0.0143*
24 -5.7366  -0.8867  0.3752  -91.1029  -2.5710  0.0101*
25 -13.0653  -2.0195  0.0434* -104.1682 -2.8919  0.0038**
26 9.8459  1.5219  0.1280  -94.3223  -2.5773  0.0100**
27 2.8035  0.4333  0.6648  -91.5188  -2.4625  0.0138*
28 7.2760  1.1247  0.2607  -84.2428  -2.2332  0.0255*
29 -0.4658  -0.0720  0.9426  -84.7085  -2.2132  0.0269*
30 -5.0206  -0.7760  0.4377  -89.7291  -2.3116  0.0208*
31 7.3780  1.1404  0.2541  -82.3511  -2.0927  0.0364*
32 -4.6790  -0.7232  0.4695  -87.0301  -2.1823  0.0291*
33 3.9847  0.6159  0.5379  -83.0454  -2.0555  0.0398*
34 -16.7334  -2.5865  0.0097** -99.7788 -2.4386 0.0147*
35 -3.0443  -0.4706  0.6379  -102.8232  -2.4822  0.0131*
36 3.5072  0.5421  0.5877  -99.3159  -2.3688  0.0178*37 -7.0026  -1.0824  0.2791  -106.3185 -2.5061  0.0122*
38 -2.0280  -0.3135  0.7539  -108.3465  -2.5248  0.0116*
39 1.9141  0.2959  0.7673  -106.4325  -2.4524  0.0142*
40 0.6893  0.1066  0.9151  -105.7431  -2.4099  0.0160*
41 3.1519  0.4872  0.6261  -102.5912  -2.3131  0.0207*
42 10.1327  1.5662  0.1173 -92.4585  -2.0628  0.0391*
43 12.4273  1.9209  0.0547 -80.0313  -1.7672 0.0772 
44 -16.3149  -2.5218  0.0117* -96.3462 -2.1061 0.0352*
45 7.1149  1.0998  0.2714  -89.2313  -1.9314  0.0534 
46 5.2120  0.8056  0.4205  -84.0193  -1.8010  0.0717 
47 1.8939  0.2927  0.7697  -82.1254  -1.7437  0.0812 
48 -4.5872  -0.7090  0.4783  -86.7125  -1.8240  0.0682 
49 -8.9143  -1.3779  0.1682  -95.6268  -1.9931  0.0463*
50 -2.9909  -0.4623  0.6439  -98.6177  -2.0370  0.0416*
51 -9.5516  -1.4764  0.1398  -108.1693  -2.2146  0.0268*
52 -2.3765  -0.3673  0.7134  -110.5458  -2.2437  0.0249*
53 5.6043  0.8663  0.3863  -104.9416  -2.1118  0.0347*
54 7.7337  1.1954  0.2319  -97.2078  -1.9398  0.0524 
55 -4.3984  -0.6799  0.4966  -101.6063  -2.0109  0.0443*
56 1.7933  0.2772  0.7816  -99.8130  -1.9594  0.0501 
57 -4.3143  -0.6669  0.5049  -104.1273  -2.0278  0.0426*
58 -1.7002  -0.2628  0.7927  -105.8275  -2.0447  0.0409*
59 -12.0589  -1.8640  0.0623  -117.8863 -2.2602 0.0238*
60 -6.7381  -1.0415  0.2976  -124.6244  -2.3712  0.0177*
Note:         *Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  Appendix 2 
Large Issues by mode’s Stock Price Effects Surrounding the Announcement of 
Private Placement 
This table presents the stock price effects surrounding private placement announcements by biotechnology companies as 
classified as been large issue by mode (those that issue more than $3 million) over the sample period of January 2004 to 
December 2004. The event day (Day 0) is defined as the actual date of announcement by the company. TAR is the total abnormal 
return of the cross-sectionally combined observations for the relevant event day. TSCAR is the total cumulative average 
abnormal return between day -5 and the relevant event day   
Panel A: Daily Average Abnormal Returns      
Event Day  TSAR  Z Statistic  p Value  TSCAR  Z Statistic p Value 
-5 1.1593 0.2393 0.8109  1.1593 0.2393 0.8109 
-4 -1.3986 -0.2886  0.7729  -0.2393 -0.0349  0.9721 
-3 -6.1301 -1.2651  0.2058  -6.3694 -0.7589  0.4479 
-2 -2.9567 -0.6102  0.5417  -9.3261 -0.9623  0.3359 
-1 -0.7077 -0.1460  0.8839 -10.0338 -0.9261  0.3544 
0 -7.2477 -1.4958  0.1347 -17.2815 -1.4560  0.1454 
1 -17.4712  -3.6056 0.0003** -34.7527 -2.7108  0.0067** 
2 1.7154 0.3540 0.7233  -33.0373  -2.4106  0.0159* 
3 -3.9598 -0.8172  0.4138 -36.9971 -2.5451 0.0109* 
4 4.8967 1.0106 0.3122  -32.1004  -2.0949  0.0362* 
5 -3.7575 -0.7754  0.4381 -35.8579 -2.2312 0.0257* 
6 -2.4743 -0.5106  0.6096 -38.3322 -2.2837 0.0224* 
7 -8.6683 -1.7889  0.0736 -47.0005 -2.6902  0.0071** 
8 -3.0456 -0.6285  0.5297 -50.0461 -2.7604  0.0058** 
9 -7.6269 -1.5740  0.1155 -57.6730 -3.0732  0.0021** 
10 -3.6846 -0.7604  0.4470 -61.3576 -3.1657  0.0015** 
11 -2.5807 -0.5326  0.5943 -63.9383 -3.2003  0.0014** 
12 8.7802 1.8120 0.0700  -55.1581  -2.6831  0.0073** 
13 -5.5267 -1.1406  0.2540 -60.6848 -2.8732  0.0041** 
14 4.0841 0.8429 0.3993  -56.6007  -2.6120  0.0090** 
15 -5.3695 -1.1081  0.2678 -61.9702 -2.7908  0.0053** 
16 3.6030 0.7436 0.4571  -58.3672  -2.5681  0.0102* 
17 -5.0047 -1.0328  0.3017 -63.3718 -2.7270  0.0064** 
18 -7.4514 -1.5378  0.1241 -70.8232 -2.9835  0.0028** 
19 -1.9332 -0.3990  0.6899 -72.7563 -3.0030  0.0027** 
20 -5.9349 -1.2248  0.2206 -78.6912 -3.1849  0.0014** 
21 4.9914 1.0301 0.3030  -73.6998  -2.9271  0.0034** 
22 -9.5164 -1.9640 0.0495* -83.2162 -3.2455  0.0012** 
23 -1.2840 -0.2650  0.7910 -84.5002 -3.2383  0.0012** 
24 -3.9802 -0.8214  0.4114 -88.4804 -3.3338  0.0009** 
25 -8.0233 -1.6558  0.0978 -96.5037 -3.5770  0.0003** 
26 4.4004 0.9081 0.3638  -92.1034  -3.3602  0.0008** 
27 -3.7955 -0.7833  0.4334 -95.8989 -3.4452  0.0006** 
28 10.3119  2.1281 0.0333* -85.5870 -3.0292  0.0025** 
29 2.8527 0.5887 0.5560  -82.7343  -2.8861  0.0039** 
30 -4.1234 -0.8510  0.3948 -86.8578 -2.9876  0.0028** 
31 3.0135 0.6219 0.5340  -83.8443  -2.8447  0.0044** 
32 -1.6886 -0.3485  0.7275 -85.5329 -2.8635  0.0042** 
33 0.2647 0.0546 0.9564  -85.2682  -2.8178  0.0048** 
34 -5.7386 -1.1843  0.2363 -91.0068 -2.9696  0.0030** 35 -2.5046 -0.5169  0.6052 -93.5114 -3.0139  0.0026** 
36 2.3407 0.4831 0.6290  -91.1707  -2.9033  0.0037** 
37 -4.6688 -0.9635  0.3353 -95.8395 -3.0163  0.0026** 
38 -3.6542 -0.7541  0.4508 -99.4937 -3.0955  0.0020** 
39 -2.7956 -0.5769  0.5640  -102.2893 -3.1469  0.0017** 
40 -5.3934 -1.1131  0.2657  -107.6826 -3.2766  0.0011** 
41 -0.1252 -0.0258  0.9794  -107.8079 -3.2453  0.0012** 
42 1.4559 0.3005 0.7638  -106.3520  -3.1680  0.0015** 
43 12.5959  2.5995  0.0093** -93.7561 -2.7641  0.0057** 
44 -11.6006  -2.3941  0.0167* -105.3567 -3.0749  0.0021** 
45 2.6956 0.5563 0.5780  -102.6610  -2.9667  0.0030** 
46 -3.2589 -0.6725  0.5012  -105.9199 -3.0313  0.0024** 
47 -0.0711 -0.0147  0.9883  -105.9910 -3.0046  0.0027** 
48 -1.5400 -0.3178  0.7506  -107.5311 -3.0199  0.0025** 
49 -8.1052 -1.6727  0.0944  -115.6363 -3.2179  0.0013** 
50 0.3998 0.0825 0.9342  -115.2365  -3.1780  0.0015** 
51 -6.8282 -1.4092  0.1588  -122.0647 -3.3367  0.0008** 
52 -4.9881 -1.0294  0.3033  -127.0529 -3.4429  0.0006** 
53 5.8698 1.2114 0.2257  -121.1830  -3.2559  0.0011** 
54 0.3824 0.0789 0.9371  -120.8006  -3.2185  0.0013** 
55 2.6822 0.5535 0.5799  -118.1184  -3.1211  0.0018** 
56 0.5346 0.1103 0.9122  -117.5839  -3.0818  0.0021** 
57 -1.5741 -0.3248  0.7453  -119.1579 -3.0982  0.0019** 
58 -0.5548 -0.1145  0.9088  -119.7127 -3.0882  0.0020** 
59 -11.7486  -2.4246  0.0153* -131.4613 -3.3651  0.0008** 
60 -11.8636  -2.4484  0.0144* -143.3249 -3.6409  0.0003** 
 Note:         *Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  Appendix 3 
Small Issues by mode’s Stock Price Effects Surrounding the Announcement of 
Private Placement 
This table presents the stock price effects surrounding private placement announcements by biotechnology companies as 
classified as been small issue by mode (those that issue $3 million or less) over the sample period of January 2004 to December 
2004. The event day (Day 0) is defined as the actual date of announcement by the company. TAR is the total abnormal return of 
the cross-sectionally combined observations for the relevant event day. TSCAR is the total cumulative average abnormal return 
between day -5 and the relevant event day   
  
Panel A: Daily Average Abnormal Returns     
Event Day  TAR  Z Statistic  p Value  TSCAR  Z Statistic p Value 
-5 -0.2405 -0.0561  0.9553 -0.2405 -0.0561  0.9553 
-4 1.5572 0.3633 0.7164 1.3167 0.2172 0.8281 
-3 -2.6202 -0.6113  0.5410 -1.3036 -0.1756  0.8606 
-2 -0.2307 -0.0538  0.9571 -1.5342 -0.1790  0.8580 
-1 3.1682 0.7391 0.4598 1.6340 0.1705 0.8646 
0  -0.2596  -0.0606 0.9517 1.3744 0.1309 0.8959 
1 0.2152 0.0502 0.9600 1.5896 0.1402 0.8885 
2 -1.9319 -0.4507  0.6522 -0.3423 -0.0282  0.9775 
3 2.7775 0.6480 0.5170 2.4353 0.1894 0.8498 
4 2.5983 0.6061 0.5444 5.0336 0.3713 0.7104 
5 0.1449 0.0338 0.9730 5.1785 0.3642 0.7157 
6 7.2427 1.6896 0.0911  12.4212 0.8365 0.4029 
7  -7.9908  -1.8641 0.0623 4.4304 0.2867 0.7744 
8  -3.9968  -0.9324 0.3511 0.4336 0.0270 0.9784 
9 3.6970 0.8625 0.3884 4.1307 0.2488 0.8035 
10 1.8423 0.4298 0.6674 5.9729 0.3483 0.7276 
11  -1.9684  -0.4592 0.6461 4.0045 0.2266 0.8208 
12  -1.9971  -0.4659 0.6413 2.0074 0.1104 0.9121 
13 -2.0111 -0.4692  0.6390 -0.0037 -0.0002  0.9998 
14 -1.3900 -0.3243  0.7457 -1.3937 -0.0727  0.9420 
15 0.7071 0.1650 0.8690  -0.6866  -0.0350 0.9721 
16 -11.7831  -2.7488  0.0060  -12.4697 -0.6202  0.5351 
17 2.9009 0.6767 0.4986  -9.5688  -0.4655 0.6416 
18 4.4040 1.0274 0.3042  -5.1648  -0.2459 0.8057 
19 0.1315 0.0307 0.9755  -5.0333  -0.2348 0.8143 
20 1.6734 0.3904 0.6963  -3.3599  -0.1537 0.8778 
21 -3.6677 -0.8556  0.3922 -7.0276 -0.3155  0.7524 
22 6.3710 1.4862 0.1372  -0.6567  -0.0289 0.9769 
23 -0.2095 -0.0489  0.9610 -0.8661 -0.0375  0.9701 
24 -1.7563 -0.4097  0.6820 -2.6225 -0.1117  0.9111 
25 -5.0420 -1.1762  0.2395 -7.6645 -0.3211  0.7481 
26 5.4456 1.2704 0.2040  -2.2189  -0.0915 0.9271 
27 6.5991 1.5395 0.1237 4.3801 0.1779 0.8588 
28  -3.0359  -0.7082 0.4788 1.3442 0.0538 0.9571 
29 -3.3184 -0.7741  0.4389 -1.9742 -0.0778  0.9379 
30 -0.8972 -0.2093  0.8342 -2.8714 -0.1116  0.9111 
31 4.3645 1.0182 0.3086 1.4932 0.0573 0.9543 
32 -2.9904 -0.6976  0.4854 -1.4972 -0.0567  0.9548 
33 3.7200 0.8678 0.3855 2.2228 0.0830 0.9338 34 -10.9948  -2.5649  0.0103  -8.7720 -0.3236  0.7463 
35 -0.5397 -0.1259  0.8998 -9.3117 -0.3393  0.7344 
36 1.1665 0.2721 0.7855  -8.1452  -0.2932 0.7694 
37 -2.3339 -0.5445  0.5861  -10.4791 -0.3728  0.7093 
38 1.6262 0.3794 0.7044  -8.8528  -0.3113 0.7555 
39 4.7096 1.0987 0.2719  -4.1432  -0.1441 0.8854 
40 6.0827 1.4190 0.1559 1.9395 0.0667 0.9468 
41 3.2771 0.7645 0.4446 5.2166 0.1775 0.8591 
42 8.6768 2.0242 0.0430  13.8934 0.4678 0.6399 
43  -0.1686  -0.0393 0.9686  13.7248 0.4574 0.6474 
44  -4.7144  -1.0998 0.2714 9.0104 0.2973 0.7663 
45 4.4193 1.0310 0.3026  13.4298 0.4387 0.6609 
46 8.4708 1.9761 0.0481  21.9006 0.7085 0.4786 
47 1.9651 0.4584 0.6466  23.8657 0.7648 0.4444 
48  -3.0471  -0.7109 0.4772  20.8185 0.6609 0.5087 
49  -0.8090  -0.1887 0.8503  20.0095 0.6294 0.5291 
50  -3.3907  -0.7910 0.4289  16.6188 0.5181 0.6044 
51  -2.7233  -0.6353 0.5252  13.8955 0.4294 0.6677 
52 2.6116 0.6092 0.5424  16.5070 0.5056 0.6131 
53  -0.2656  -0.0620 0.9506  16.2414 0.4933 0.6218 
54 7.3514 1.7150 0.0864  23.5928 0.7105 0.4774 
55  -7.0806  -1.6518 0.0986  16.5122 0.4932 0.6219 
56 1.2587 0.2936 0.7690  17.7709 0.5265 0.5985 
57  -2.7403  -0.6393 0.5226  15.0306 0.4418 0.6587 
58  -1.1454  -0.2672 0.7893  13.8852 0.4049 0.6856 
59  -0.3103  -0.0724 0.9423  13.5749 0.3928 0.6945 
60 5.1255 1.1957 0.2318  18.7005 0.5370 0.5913 
 Note:         *Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
 